The Conundrum of Applying an Incoherent First Amendment Jurisprudence: Glassroth v. Moore by Smith, David Nathan
Mississippi College Law Review 
Volume 24 
Issue 1 Vol. 24 Iss 1 Article 8 
2005 
The Conundrum of Applying an Incoherent First Amendment 
Jurisprudence: Glassroth v. Moore 
David Nathan Smith 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Custom Citation 
24 Miss. C. L. Rev. 115 (2004-2005) 
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact walter@mc.edu. 





During the night of July 31, 2001, Chief Justice Roy Moore rolled a 5,280
pound granite monument into the rotunda of the Alabama Supreme Court over
which he presided.' The top of the monument was divided into two tablets, each
of which was engraved with excerpts from Exodus 20:2-17 of the King James
Bible.' Suit was quickly filed in district court to remove this "Ten
Commandments" monument.' The plaintiffs, attorneys who practiced before the
supreme court and were forced to walk by the monument in the course of their
work, alleged that the monument violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.6 The district court agreed and
issued an injunction ordering Justice Moore to remove the offensive monument.7
Justice Moore refused to obey the directive of the district court and appealed to
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.8 The resulting firestorm of controversy
ultimately culminated in the removal of the Chief Justice from his position on
the court.
Few were surprised when the Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the dis-
trict court and affirmed the injunction. Presumably, the refusal of the United
States Supreme Court to grant certiorari to Justice Moore's appeal gave credence
to the Court of Appeals' decision. However, one could surmise that the Supreme
Court's decision would have been different had the facts of Justice Moore's case
been even slightly different. In fact, the "muddy waters" of the Supreme Court's
* J.D. candidate, May 2005. The author would like to thank Professor Mark Modak-Truran for his
assistance, both inside and outside the classroom, in framing the issues addressed in this Note.
1. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 636 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. 335 F.3d 1282 (11 th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 497 (2003).
3. Id. at 1285-86.
4. Id. The left tablet read as follows:
Thou Shalt Have No Other Gods Before Me
Though Shalt Not Make Unto Thee Any Graven Image
Thou Shalt Not Take the Name of The Lord Thy God in Vain
Remember the Sabbath Day, to Keep it Holy.
The right tablet read:
Honour thy Father and thy Mother
Thou Shalt Not Kill
Thou Shalt Not Commit Adultery
Thou Shalt Not Steal
Thou Shalt Not Bear False Witness
Thou Shalt Not Covet.
5. Id. at 1284.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1288.
8. See Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1288.
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence rarely produce predictable results.9 The
Court unabashedly engages in a case by case factual analysis.1" Consequently,
no criticism will be levied here against the Eleventh Circuit's application of
Supreme Court precedent, since the precedent itself is confusing and disjointed.
Rather, the purpose of this Note is to examine whether Justice Moore, had he uti-
lized different arguments or changed his position to some extent, would have
presented a sufficient constitutional argument before the Supreme Court to justi-
fy certiorari.
II. FACTS
The facts relevant to the instant case essentially began when Roy Moore
campaigned for the office of Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court."
Although Justice Moore never referred to himself as such, the lower court found
that his campaign platform was that of the "Ten Commandments Judge" who
would restore the moral foundations of the law.12 Following his election, Justice
Moore fulfilled his campaign promise and installed the Ten Commandments
monument [hereinafter "the monument"] in the rotunda of the State Supreme
Court. 3 In doing so, Justice Moore exercised his authority under the Alabama
Constitution to place displays in the rotunda. 4 He was also careful to note that
the monument had been financed entirely out of his own pocket; no government
funds had been expended.1
The district court found that the monument was placed in such a manner that
no one who entered the State Supreme Court building from the front could miss
the monument. 6 The monument was located directly across from the main
entrance in the rotunda. 7 Anyone who desired access to the public elevator,
stairs, law library, or restrooms would have to pass by the monument. 8 The
court found that Justice Moore purposefully placed the monument in this con-
spicuous location so that "everyone visiting the Judicial Building would see it."1"
9. See DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 405 (2d Cir. 2001) (speaking of the
Establishment Clause, the court noted: "Although the Supreme Court has struggled for more than a century to
translate those spare terms into concrete rules and consistent doctrine, the Court has found itself compelled by
candor to acknowledge that it can only dimly perceive the boundaries of permissible government activity in
this sensitive area. In the wake of a number of fragmented Court decisions over the past decade, the governing
law remains in doubt.") (citing Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000)) (internal quotes omitted) (emphasis
added); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (noting that "[the
Supreme Court's] Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray") (Thomas, J., concurring). To
illustrate, a recent Westlaw search by the author on the subject of First Amendment cases produced fifty-four
results. Not a single case failed to be marked by a yellow flag.
10. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) ("In each case, the inquiry calls for line drawing;
no fixed, per se rule can be framed.").
11. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1284-85.
12. Id. at 1285.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.10; ALA. CODE § 41-10-275). The lower court noted that
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Besides the Ten Commandments, the monument also was engraved with a
large-sized and several smaller-sized quotations.2 These quotations were from
secular sources." The sloping top and "religious appearance"22 of the tablets
caused the monument to resemble an open Bible. 3 The court noted that the
appearance and location of the monument caused one to feel that she was "in the
presence of something not just valued and revered (such as a historical docu-
ment) but also holy and sacred."2
When the monument was publicly unveiled, Justice Moore announced that
he had placed the monument in order to depict the moral foundations of law.2
He cited the Alabama Constitution as his basis for invoking "the favor and guid-
ance of Almighty God."26 Thus, in order to restore the moral foundation of the
law, he stated that it was necessary to also recognize the source of morality
itself.2 He recounted instances in history where God had been openly acknowl-
edged (presumably by government).28
Subsequent to the installation of the monument, Justice Moore denied two
requests to place other displays in the rotunda. 9 The first request was for a mon-
ument containing the "I have a Dream" speech of the Rev. Martin Luther King
Jr." Justice Moore denied this display because he believed that the placement of
a man's speech next to the word of God would diminish the purpose of the mon-
ument: to acknowledge the sovereignty of God over men.3 The second request
was for a display containing a symbol of atheism.32
Justice Moore did however add two other displays after the installation of
the monument.3 The first was a plaque entitled "Moral Foundation of Law"
20. Id. at 1286.
21. Id. The court emphasized that the secular quotes had been placed below the Ten Commandments
because Justice Moore believed that the words of men could not be placed "on the same plane as the Word of
God." Id.
22. "Religious appearance" seems to be a vague and potentially biased description. For example, what
exactly are the qualities of a "religious" object? Question may be raised as to why the district court judge did
not use a more objective description of the monument. Perhaps the judge was taking an approach similar to
that taken by Justice Stewart in the free speech context in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (regard-
ing obscenity: "I know it when I see it."). According to the court in Glassroth, the factfinder in this instance
was expressing a subjective opinion for purposes of satisfying the reasonable observer test. See infra note 232,
and accompanying text.
23. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1291.
24. Id. at 1286. The court also found that employees and visitors considered the building (or the rotunda)
an appropriate and inviting place to pray. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting ALA. CONST. pmbl.).
27. Id. at 1287.
28. Id. During the lower court trial, Justice Moore agreed under cross-examination that the monument
reflected the sovereignty of God over the affairs of men, the monument was intended to acknowledge God's
overruling power over the affairs of men, and that the God referred to was the God of the Holy Scriptures. Id.
29. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1287 (A third request to actually modify the existing monument was denied as
well. The requested modification was to add a 50 foot tall marble statue of Charlton Heston holding the Ten
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which contained a quotation from the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.'s letter from
the Birmingham jail where he was imprisoned.' The quote regarded just laws
and "the moral law or law of God."3 The plaque also contained a quotation
from Frederick Douglass which referred to slavery as hiding man "from the laws
of God."36 The plaque, like the monument, was paid for by Justice Moore entire-
ly with his own money." It measured forty-two inches by thirty-two inches. 8
The second display was a brass plaque which contained the Bill of Rights and
measured thirty inches by thirty-six inches. 9 Justice Moore believed that these
plaques comported with the "moral foundation of law" theme of the monument."
The court found that the plaques were diminutive when compared to the monu-
ment and were thus inconspicuous.41
Suit was filed by three attorneys who practiced in the Alabama courts.4
Because of their professional obligations, each of the attorneys had entered the
judicial building before and would have to enter the building again in the
future. 3 The central location of the monument caused them to pass by it when-
ever they entered the judicial building." The plaintiffs claimed that the monu-
ment offended them and made them feel like "outsiders."4 Two of the plaintiffs
claimed to have reduced their number of visits to the judicial building because of
the monument.46 One of the two had begun avoiding the building and had even
purchased law books and an online research service to avoid use of the law
library.4
The three plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that the actions of
Justice Moore were unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.' The plaintiffs further requested
that the court issue an injunction to force Justice Moore to remove the monu-
ment.49 After a bench trial, the trial court ruled that Justice Moore's actions vio-
lated the Establishment Clause and gave him thirty days to voluntarily remove
the monument.5 " He failed to do so, and the court subsequently filed an injunc-




35. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1287.
36. Id. at 1287-88.









46. Id. They also claimed to enjoy the rotunda less due to the presence of the monument. Id.
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III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." 3 The application of the clause reading "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion," 4 is the subject of the following case
law. The principal issue in Glassroth was whether the monument violated this
so-called Establishment Clause. Although several tertiary issues were raised by
Justice Moore on appeal, the cases dealt with in this section will be entirely con-
cerned with the Establishment Clause issue. In keeping with the purpose of this
Note, cases will be discussed which were not cited by the court in Glassroth, but
which nevertheless have bearing on the Establishment Clause issue. The princi-
pal Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases relied upon by the court will be
treated in full as well.
The modern establishment clause jurisprudence of the Supreme Court began
in 1947 with the case Everson v. Board of Education.5 The Court in Everson
was concerned with whether a New Jersey statute which financially reimbursed
parents of children for the expense of public transportation to and from parochial
schools was a violation of the Establishment Clause. 6
The first question raised was whether the Establishment Clause could even
apply to the actions of the state, since the language of the Amendment clearly
states that it applies only to the actions of the United States Congress. 7 The
Court found that the First Amendment did in fact apply to actions of the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8
Justice Black, writing for the majority, next explored the issue of whether
the challenged statute violated the Establishment Clause." In an effort to define
the boundaries of the Establishment Clause, he noted:
[The Establishment Clause] means at least this: Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person
to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs
or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any reli-
gious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
53. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
54. Id.
55. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
56. Id. at 3.
57. See id. at 7-8.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 8.
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secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a
wall of separation between church and State. 60
Despite the foregoing language, Justice Black nevertheless found that the
statute in question did not violate the Establishment Clause. 61 He reasoned that
the Establishment Clause "requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be
their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions
than it is to favor them. '62 Thus, a state law which was neutral in purpose (or
had a "public purpose"), in that it did nothing more than facilitate a student's
attendance of the school of her choice,63 was held to be permissive under the
Establishment Clause.' In doing so, the Court recognized that church and state
relations could conceivably become intertwined at some indirect level, while still
passing muster under the First Amendment.
Justice Jackson filed a dissent in which he argued that the Majority's deci-
sion was inconsistent with its reasoning.6" He argued that a "complete and
uncompromising separation of Church from State" meant that the State of New
Jersey could not expend taxpayer funds in any manner which would directly or
indirectly aid the parochial schools.
66
Justice Rutledge also filed a dissenting opinion which argued for the "com-
plete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil
authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for
religion ... [n]ot simply an established church, but any law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion is forbidden. '6' He further urged a "complete division of
religion and civil authority" based upon his reading of the history surrounding
the adoption of the First Amendment.66
Perhaps the most widely cited Supreme Court case dealing with the
Establishment Clause is Lemon v. Kurtzman." Lemon regarded two state statutes
which authorized the supplement of teachers' salaries in nonpublic schools.7
The statutes specified, though, that the teachers could only be supplemented for
the teaching of secular subjects." Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger
found the statutes to be unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause. 2
60. Id. at 15-16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
61. Everson, 330U.S. at 18.
62. Id. at 18.
63. Interestingly enough, Justice Black further noted that the statute may have actually encouraged par-
ents to send their children to parochial schools. Id. at 17. This was still held not to be a violation. Id. at 18.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67 Everson, 330 U.S. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 63.
69. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
70. Id. at 607.
71. Id. More specifically, the teacher "must use only teaching materials which are used in the public
schools." Id. at 608. The teacher is not allowed "to teach a course in religion for so long as or during such
time as he or she receives any salary supplements ...." Id.
72. Id. at 625.
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In making his decision, Chief Justice Burger elucidated a three part test for
Establishment Clause challenges.73 First, the challenged statute must have a sec-
ular legislative purpose.7" Second, the principal or primary effect of the statute
must not advance nor inhibit religion.7 Third, the statute must not create "an
excessive government entanglement with religion." 6 Applying the test to the set
of facts before it, the Court found that the statutes in question had secular legisla-
tive purposes.77 The Court also found that the principal effect of the statutes nei-
ther advanced nor inhibited religion.78 However, the Court found that the
statutes fostered an excessive entanglement of government with religion.79
Violation of any prong of the test meant that the statute must fail." The statutes
were therefore unable to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Justice Douglas filed a concurring opinion which emphasized the separation
of church and state: "We have announced over and over again that the use of tax-
payers' money to support parochial schools violates the First Amendment."81
Quoting Everson, he noted "'No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion."' 82 The issue for
Douglas, then, was not whether the government had become excessively entan-
gled with religion. Rather, the issue was whether government was entangled at
all with religion.83
In 1980, the Court, without granting certiorari, issued a per curiam opinion
in the case of Stone v. Graham.' In Stone, the Court tested the constitutionality
of a Kentucky statute which required the posting of the Ten Commandments in
every classroom within the state's public schools.8" Applying the Lemon test, the
Court concerned itself primarily with whether the statute had a secular legislative
purpose.8" The Court found that an "avowed" secular purpose of the Kentucky
legislature in this instance was inadequate:87 "The pre-eminent purpose for post-
73. Id. at 612.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. Although the Court still adheres to parts of this test in form, it has drastical-
ly departed in principle. See infra notes 114, 313 and accompanying text.
77. Id. at 613.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 621-22, 624-25. The Court actually seemed to suggest that the statutes in question did not cause
excessive entanglement in and of themselves. However, the Court feared future consequences if more statutes
were passed for similar reasons. As Chief Justice Burger noted: "while some involvement and entanglement
are inevitable, lines must be drawn." Id. at 625.
80. Id. at 612-13. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) ("If a statute violates any of [the
Lemon] principles, it must be struck down under the Establishment Clause.").
81. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 640 (Douglas, J., concurring).
82. Id. (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 16).
83. See id. (emphasis supplied).
84. 449 U.S. 39.
85. Id. at 39-40 (emphasis supplied).
86. Id. at41.
87. Id. The purpose of the statute, noted at the bottom of each Ten Commandments display, was stated as
follows: "The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental
legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States." Id.
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ing the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in
nature."88 The Court therefore made clear that it would be the Court, and not the
State Legislature, that would decide whether the purpose of a statute was secular
or not.8"
Justices Burger and Blackmun dissented, stating simply that they would
have granted certiorari and considered the merits of the case.9 Justice Stewart
dissented from the Supreme Court's substitution of their judgment for the judg-
ment of the lower state courts which had upheld the statute.91 He believed that
the state courts had "applied wholly correct constitutional criteria in reaching
their decisions. 92
Justice Rehnquist filed a written dissent in which he criticized the majority's
dismissal of the lower court's "statutory findings."93 He argued instead that
great "secular significance" could be found in the Ten Commandments.94
Furthermore, he intimated that strict secularism was perhaps not a constitutional-
ly mandated approach:
The Establishment Clause does not require that the public sector
be insulated from all things which may have a religious signifi-
cance or origin. This Court has recognized that religion has
been closely identified with our history and government and that
the history of man is inseparable from the history of religion.9
Finally, he criticized the majority's "cavalier summary reversal" of the findings
of the "highest court of Kentucky." 98
Marsh v. Chambers,97 decided the issue of whether the practice of opening
each session of the Nebraska legislature with a prayer made by a chaplain paid
through state funds violated the Establishment Clause. 8 Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority, found the practice to be constitutional under the First
Amendment.9 9 In doing so, he did not apply the three part Lemon test. Instead,
he based his decision on "[t]he unbroken practice for two centuries in the
National Congress, for more than a century in Nebraska and in many other
states" of paid chaplains and prayer before legislative sessions.1"' He noted:
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Stone, 449 U.S. at 43 (Burger & Blackmun, J.J., dissenting).
91. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 44-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 45.
95. Id. at 45-46 (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 434 (1962)) (internal quotes omitted).
96. Stone, 449 U.S. at 47.
97. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
98. Id. at 784-785.
99. Id. at 793-94.
100. Id. at 795.
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The opening of session of legislative and other deliberative public
bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition
of this country. From colonial times through the founding of the
Republic and ever since, the practice of legislative prayer has
coexisted with the principles of disestablishment and religious
freedom ... [in] light of the unambiguous and unbroken history
of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of
opening legislative sessions with a prayer has become part of the
fabric of our society. [It] is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of
beliefs widely held among the people of this country. 01
Justice Brennan filed a lengthy dissent, claiming that the practice of legislative
prayer violated principles of separation and neutrality found in the Establishment
Clause. 2 Relying on the Lemon test, he placed particular emphasis on the fact
that the practice of legislative prayer could have no secular purpose, and that it
intruded on the rights of conscience held by individual legislators. 3
Justice Stevens also dissented, taking issue with the fact that the Chaplain in
question was a Presbyterian minister who had held the position for over sixteen
years. 4 He reasoned that because of the Chaplain's length of tenure and his
religious beliefs, and the fact that the legislature was composed of representa-
tives of diverse religious backgrounds, the state was directly supporting one reli-
gion over others. '
In Lynch v. Donnelly,"0 6 the Court was called upon to decide whether a
creche" 7 displayed in a public park violated the Establishment Clause. 8 The
creche was owned by a city in Rhode Island and was included in the city's annual
Christmas display.0 9 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger found that the
creche was not an unconstitutional endorsement of religion by the state.1 He noted:
No significant segment of our society and no institution within it
can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all
the other parts, much less from government. It has never been
thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total
separation ... [n]or does the Constitution require complete sep-
aration of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommo-
dation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostili-
ty toward any."
101. Id. at 786-92.
102. Id. at 808 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797-98.
104. Id. at 822-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
107. A "cr6che" is a nativity scene. Id. at 671.
108. Id. 670-71.
109. Id. at 671.
110. Id. at 685.
111. Id. at 673 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973)
(citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1952); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211
(1948))) (internal quotes omitted). This statement marked the introduction of the accommodationist interpreta-
tion of the Establishment Clause. See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
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He also cited the historical aspects of religion in government, arguing that
"[t]here is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches
of government of the role of religion in American life from at least 1789 . . .
'[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.' ' ' . 2
As if to emphasize his point, he went on to state "[t]he very chamber in which
oral arguments on this case were heard is decorated with a notable and perma-
nent-not seasonal-symbol of religion: Moses with Ten Commandments [sic]."113
Justice Burger specifically declined to apply the Lemon test, claiming that "we
have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test
or criterion in this sensitive area." '14 Under this reasoning, the creche was found
to be permissible under the Establishment Clause, despite its religious signifi-
cance.
11 5
Justice O'Connor concurred in the result, but wrote separately to "clarify"
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence." According to her analysis,
there were two ways in which government could infringe the Establishment
Clause: First, it could become excessively entangled with religion.1 Second,
government could either endorse or disapprove of religion. 8 She concerned her
opinion specifically with whether the government had endorsed religion by dis-
playing the creche.1 9 Endorsement, in her view, was violative of the
Establishment Clause because it sent "a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community .... ,"1 2 In order to deter-
mine whether the government had endorsed religion, she focused primarily on
the purpose prong of the Lemon test.12 ' The proper inquiry, she argued, was
"whether the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disap-
proval of religion." '22 However, she found that the creche in question did not
constitute an endorsement of religion because it was understood in the context of
the holiday season. '23 Thus, the message the government conveyed through the
creche was secular in nature. '24
Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the government was endorsing, or
approving, the Christian religion by funding the creche. 2 ' He argued that the
112. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 675 (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313).
113. Id. at 677.
114. Id. at 679.
115. Id. at 687.
116. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 687-88.
118. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
119. Id. at 687-88.
120. Id. at 688.
121. Id. at 690-92.
122. Id. at 691. Although Justice O'Connor stated that the government's purposes in erecting or support-
ing the display were of primary relevance, she gave little indication as to how one should ascertain the pur-
pose(s) of government. Id. at 690-92. Presumably to fill this gap, her opinions in later cases establish the "rea-
sonable observer" test to determine whether the government has endorsed religion.
123. Id. at 691.
124. "The creche is a traditional symbol of the holiday that is very commonly displayed along with purely
secular symbols .... Government celebration of the holiday is not understood to endorse the religious content
of the holiday .... Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692.
125. Id. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Lemon test should apply, and that, despite the fact that the avowed purpose of the
display was secular, the true religious nature of the display could be inferred.12 6
He also took issue with the Court's interpretation of history, arguing that
Christmas was not widely celebrated until well into the nineteenth century.127
Justice Blackmun also filed a dissent, noting in particular his belief that the
Court had stripped the creche of any religious meaning.128 The result, he rea-
soned, was that "Christians feel constrained in acknowledging [the] symbolic
meaning [of the creche] and non-Christians feel alienated by its presence. 129
The Court again had opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of a creche
display in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union.3° Suit was
filed to force the removal of two annual Christmas displays located in
Pittsburgh. 31 The first display was a creche located on the staircase leading to
the Allegheny County Courthouse. 3 2 The second display was a Chanukah
menorah placed beside the City-County Building and next to a Christmas tree
and a sign saluting liberty. 33
Justice Blackmun, writing only for a plurality, upheld the constitutionality of
the menorah, but struck down the creche." Relying on Everson, Lemon, and
Lynch, he argued that the essential question was whether the government had
endorsed religion by its use of the displays.135 By distinguishing the display in
Allegheny from the display in Lynch, he found that the creche conveyed a dis-
tinctly religious message. 136 The menorah, however, imparted no such message
because it was surrounded by the aforementioned Christmas tree and sign.1 37
Justice O'Connor wrote separately to summarize her test:
The question under endorsement analysis, in short, is whether a
reasonable observer would view such longstanding practices as a
disapproval of his or her particular religious choices, in light of
the fact that they serve a secular purpose rather than a sectarian
one and have largely lost their religious significance over time.3 8
This test was satisfied no matter whether the state action had the purpose of
endorsing religion, or whether it merely caused the effect of endorsing religion. 39
Based on this reasoning, she likewise found the creche to be an unconstitutional
endorsement of religion, while the menorah escaped constitutional prohibition. 4
126. Id. at 698-702.
127. Id. at 723-24.
128. Id. at 726-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 727.
130. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).




135. Id. at 593-94.
136. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 590-99. He noted in particular that the creche in Allegheny stood alone; there
was no backdrop of non-religious Christmas symbols to "neutralize" the creche. Id. at 595-96.
137. Id. at 620-21.
138. Id. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1294-96 (2d
ed. 1988)).
139. See id. at 631-32.
140. Id. at 637.
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Justice Brennan concurred as to the creche, but dissented as to the meno-
rah."4' He believed that the menorah was religious in nature just as the creche.'42
Justice Stevens filed yet another partial concurrence and partial dissent on the
same grounds. a14  He emphasized the incongruence of the Court's decision in
allowing the display of one religion to stand, while striking down the other.' 4 He
reasoned that there is always a risk that someone could be offended by the
menorah, despite its arguably less-religious appearance.4
Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion in which he rejected the plurali-
ty's endorsement analysis outright.'46 He reasoned that implicit in the endorse-
ment analysis was "an unjustified hostility toward religion."' 47 In place of the
endorsement test, he proposed a different test:
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its
exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or cal-
lous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a
degree that it in fact establishes a state religion or religious faith,
or tends to do So.
1 4 8
He further recognized a "tradition of government accommodation and acknowl-
edgment of religion that has marked our history from the beginning."'49 Because
neither of the displays coerced religious practice or established a state church,
they both easily passed constitutional muster under Kennedy's analysis.' He
also found the displays were well within the realm of historic practice.'
The Supreme Court considered in Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Board v. Pinette,5 2 whether a Latin cross displayed on a public square adjacent
to a statehouse violated the establishment Clause. 3 Unlike the displays in Lynch
and Allegheny, the display in Capitol Square was erected by a private party."
Justice Scalia wrote for a plurality and took special note of this public/private
distinction in upholding the display of the cross. 5 He concluded that govern-
ment had no right to restrict wholly private religious speech in a public forum.'56
He was completely unconcerned with whether a reasonable observer might con-
141. Id. at 637-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
142. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 638.
143. Id. at 654 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 651.
146. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
147. Id.
148. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678) (internal quotes omitted).
149. Id. at 663.
150. Id. at 664-65.
151. Id. at679.
152. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
153. Id. at 757-59.
154. Id. at 758. The private party was, incredibly, the Ku Klux Klan. Id.
155. Id. at 764-65.
156. Id.
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fuse the private speech with government endorsement of religion."l 7 Summing
up, he noted: "It has radical implications for our public policy to suggest that
neutral laws are invalid whenever hypothetical observers may-even
reasonably-confuse an incidental benefit to religion with state endorsement.' ' 8
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, but wrote separately to empha-
size his belief that the Latin cross displayed was not religious in nature.5" He
pointed out the history of the Ku Klux Klan, and the fact that the cross was dis-
played not to convey a religious message, but instead to convey the nonreligious
message of racism. 6°
Justices O'Connor and Souter each filed separate concurrences which con-
tinued to promulgate the reasonable observer test. 1 ' They were unwilling to
completely discount the fact that a reasonable observer could under different
facts be unsure of the origins of the display and so believe it to be a government
endorsement of religion. 6 ' They also suggested that the factual differences
between Lynch, Allegheny, and the instant case were not as extreme as the plu-
rality decision suggested, since all three cases involved a public forum.6 3
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg each filed a dissent."8 Justice Stevens argued
that the Establishment Clause prevents any party, governmental or private, from
erecting a "symbol of ... religious character in, on, or before a seat of govern-
ment."' 16 Justice Ginsburg argued that the religious disclaimer on the display
was inadequate, but at the same time refused to answer the question of whether a
disclaimer could ever be deemed adequate to allow the placement of a religious
symbol on public ground.
1 66
On June 14, 2004, the Supreme Court decided the case of Elk Grove Unified
School District v. Newdow.'67 As proof of the unsettled nature of the law in this
area, the individual members of the Court filed four opinions, including a major-
ity opinion and three dissents. While the majority opinion bears little relevance
to the case at hand, the three dissents will be treated in detail.
The Newdow litigation arose when Michael A. Newdow, an atheist, filed
suit to enjoin the Elk Grove School District [hereinafter "Elk Grove"] from
including the words "under God" in the school's daily recital of the Pledge of
Allegiance. 8' Newdow's daughter, who was not named in the suit, attended Elk
Grove at the time of the filing.'69 Newdow alleged that the words "under God"
157. Id. at 765-66. However, he added that if the government gave "sectarian religious speech preferential
access to the seat of government," an Establishment Clause violation could result (along with an obvious viola-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause). Id. at 766 (emphasis supplied). This would, in his mind, be a government
endorsement of religion. Id.
158. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 768.
159. Id. at 770-72 (Thomas, J., concurring).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 772-94.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 774.
164. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 797-818.
165. Id. at 807 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
167. 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). The case is so recent that it had to be incorporated after the first draft of this
Note.
168. Id. at 2306-07.
169. Id. at 2306.
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violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the United States
Constitution. 7 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had ruled that the
Pledge was an unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause.71'
A majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, reversed the Court of Appeals and
found that Newdow lacked standing to sue on the Establishment Clause issue.'72
The Court found that Newdow's standing derived entirely from his relationship
with his daughter, but that he was involved in state court litigation regarding cus-
tody of the child.'73 Thus, Newdow lacked the right to litigate as his daughter's
next friend.'74 The Court further reiterated the existence of the so-called "domes-
tic relations exception" that precludes the federal courts from interfering in cus-
tody disputes.'75 In finding that Newdow lacked standing to sue, the Court failed
to reach the Establishment Clause issue.'76
Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion which was joined by
Justices O'Connor and by Thomas as to Part L"' First, Justice Rehnquist noted
that Newdow's standing did not stem from his daughter.'78 He noted instead that
Newdow's standing derived from his relationship to his daughter. 79 Simply put,
since Newdow was the father of his daughter, he had standing to sue on the
Establishment Clause issue that affected his child. 80
Since he found that Newdow had standing, Justice Rehnquist addressed the
Establishment Clause issue. He began by describing the legislative history of the
Pledge of Allegiance and, in particular, the addition of the words "under God" to
the Pledge. 8' He found that the purpose of the words "under God" was "to con-
trast this country's belief in God with the Soviet Union's embrace of atheism.' 
82
He further found that the primary purpose of the Pledge was to promote patrio-
tism and to bolster the nation, as opposed to describing the religious belief(s) of
the nation.'83 But, he noted that the words "under God" could mean different
things to different people, including "that God has guided the destiny of the




172. Id. at 2305.
173. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2307, 2311.
174. Id. at 2311.
175. Id. at 2309.
176. Id. at 2312. The Court's decision to find a lack of standing was openly criticized by all three dis-
senters. Id. at 2312-16. If nothing else, the majority opinion was one of the more ironic occurrences in consti-
tutional history. For instance, Justice Stevens stated: "The standing requirement is born partly of an idea,
which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and pruden-
tial limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government." Id. at 2308
(quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79
(C.A.D.C. 1982) (Bork, J., concurring)) (internal quotes omitted). Justice Stevens has had little problem with
the "powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary" in other decisions.
177. Id. at 2312.
178. Id. at 2316 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
179. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2316.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. (citing 100 Cong. Rec. 1700 (1954)).
183. Id. at 2317.
184. Id.
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Continuing, he stated that the words "under God" reflect the attitudes of various
historic national leaders, including George Washington, Abraham Lincoln,
Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Dwight D. Eisenhower.18 In
summary, he noted that "[a]ll of these events strongly suggest that our national
culture allows public recognition of our Nation's religious history and character.
. . [f]rom the time of our earliest history our peoples and our institutions have
reflected the traditional concept that our Nation was founded on a fundamental
belief in God.
18 6
Because of this historical background, Justice Rehnquist found that the
words "under God" did not convert the Pledge of Allegiance into a religious
exercise.18 Rather, he found that the Pledge "is a declaration of belief in alle-
giance and loyalty to the United States flag and the Republic that it repre-
sents. '188 This being the case, he viewed the words "under God" not as a govern-
ment endorsement of religion, but as a recognition of the traditional belief that
our Nation was founded on a fundamental belief in God.189 Justice Rehnquist
recognized that Newdow may disagree with him and others on this point, but he
found that this was no reason to give Newdow a "'heckler's veto' over a patriot-
ic ceremony willingly participated in by other students." 9
Justice O'Connor concurred with Justice Rehnquist in his dissent, but did so
on a completely different line of reasoning."" First, she found that, although
Establishment Clause issues cannot be resolved by a single test, the test to be used
in the instant case was the endorsement test. 92 She found that the endorsement
test assumes the standpoint of an objective reasonable observer. 93 The reasonable
observer does not form opinions from a purely subjective standpoint.94 Rather, the
reasonable observer evaluates the purportedly religious practice in the context of
the history and origin of the practice. 95 The key, according to Justice O'Connor,
was whether the purportedly religious practice nevertheless accomplished an
"essentially secular purpose[]." '96 Many religious practices would inevitably
accomplish this purpose because of the role religion has played in our nation's his-
tory. 97 Justice O'Connor termed such religious practices "ceremonial deism."
' 98
185. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2317-18.
186. Id. at 2319 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1693, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1954)) (internal quotes omitted).
187. Id. at 2319.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 2319-20 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1693, at 2). He further stated that "the descriptive phrase 'under
God' cannot possibly lead to the establishment of a religion, or anything like it." Id. at 2320.
190. Id. at 2320.
191. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2321 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 2321. She believed that the endorsement test "captures the essential command of the
Establishment Clause, namely, that government must not make a person's religious beliefs relevant to his or
her standing in the political community by conveying a message that religion or a particular religious belief is
favored or preferred." Id. (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring))) (internal quotes omitted).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. Justice O'Connor did not favor the idea that "[n]early any government action could be overturned
as a violation of the Establishment Clause" by such a "heckler's veto." Id. Contrast this with Justice Stevens'
approach in Allegheny. 492 U.S. at 638.
196. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2322.
197. Id. She further noted that "[i]t is unsurprising that a Nation founded by religious refugees and dedi-
cated to religious freedom should find references to divinity in its symbols, songs, mottoes, and oaths." Id.
198. Id. at 2323.
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In order to determine whether the phrase "under God" constituted an
instance of ceremonial deism, Justice O'Connor considered four factors: history
and ubiquity, absence of worship and prayer, absence of reference to particular
religion, and minimal religious content.199 From the standpoint of a reasonable
observer, she found that the words "under God" have been historically well
accepted by the public, 200 the Pledge does not constitute religious worship,2' the
words "under God" refer only to a generic god,02 and that the Pledge itself has
little or no religious content." 3 Based on these findings, she concluded that the
words "under God" carried no "religious freight" and that coercion to participate
in the Pledge was not an issue because recitation of the Pledge is not religious in
character.2" Therefore, the phrase "under God" did not represent a government
endorsement of religion and did not violate the Establishment Clause.
2 5
Justice Thomas filed a separate concurrence which took quite a different
approach to the Establishment Clause issue.' °6 First, he noted that, as a matter of
Supreme Court precedent, the Pledge policy is unconstitutional.0 7 However, he
qualified this statement by stating his belief that previous Supreme Court
Establishment Clause precedent was wrongly decided. 208  He found the prece-
dent to be faulty on two main points. 9 First, he argued that the Court had adopt-
ed an inaccurate definition of coercion. 1 Second, he argued that the Court had
improperly incorporated the Establishment Clause to apply to the states.2 1
On the issue of coercion, Justice Thomas noted that the only "kind of coer-
cion implicated by the Religion Clauses is that accomplished 'by force of law
and threat of penalty.' 21 2 In addition, the coercion must relate to an officially
established religion.2 13 Because the Pledge policy did not coerce students to par-
199. Id. at 2323-27. She stated that whether the phrase "under God" constituted ceremonial deism was a
"close question." Id. at 2323.
200. Id. at 2323-24.
201. Id. at 2324-25.
202. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2326.
203. Id. at 2326-27.
204. Id. at 2325, 2327.
205. Id. at 2327.
206. Id. at 2327-33 (Thomas, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 2330.
208. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2330. In particular, Justice Thomas reiterated Justice Scalia's dissent, which
he joined in Lee. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. at 2330 (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 640, (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Lee
addressed the constitutionality of a school prayer held during graduation ceremonies at a public school. 505
U.S. at 580. Because the case did not pertain to display of a religious object, it has been omitted from this
Note. However, it is useful to note at this point that Lee addressed the issue of coercion to participate in a reli-
gious exercise. Id. at 604. In addition, Justice Thomas noted in a footnote that the Court's decision in
Allegheny led to a "silly" outcome. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2327 n. I (citing Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573).
209. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2328-33.
210. Id. at2328-30.
211. Id. at 2330-33. Presumably, although he does not explicitly say so, Justice Thomas's position would
require the Court to overrule Everson, at least in part.
212. Id. at 2330 (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
213. Id. This implies, of course, that a particular religion must have been established. Elaborating,
Justice Thomas noted "I find much to commend the view that the Establishment Clause 'bar[s] governmental
preferences for particular religious faiths."' Id. at 2332 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 856 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
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ticipate in a particular religious exercise which was established by the state, he
found that the element of coercion was not present."1 '
On the issue of incorporation, Justice Thomas argued that, unlike the Free
Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause was never meant to apply to the
states.215 Instead, the Clause merely prohibited Congress from establishing a
national religion or from interfering with state establishments of religion.
21 6
Thus, he found that the Establishment Clause is a "federalism provision - it pro-
tects state establishments from federal interference but does not protect any indi-
vidual right. ' '217 In summary, he noted that there was no question of religious
establishment and no religious liberty rights were at issue.21 8 The Pledge there-
fore fully comported with the Constitution. 9
IV. THE INSTANT CASE
With this background of Establishment Clause cases, we next turn to the
individual holdings of the court in Glassroth. The court first acknowledged the
principal established by the foregoing cases that "Establishment Clause chal-
lenges are not decided by bright-line rules, but on a case-by-case basis with the
result turning on the specific facts. '221 With this in mind, the court turned to
Justice Moore's attacks on the findings of fact of the district court.
221
The first issue raised by Justice Moore was whether the district court judge
should have been allowed to make findings of fact based on his personal percep-
tion of the Ten Commandments monument.2 22 Justice Moore argued that the dis-
trict court judge should not have made factual findings based on his perception
of the monument, but rather should have viewed the monument simply in order
to provide "physical context within which to assess the evidence admitted in the
courtroom.12 3 The court found this argument unpersuasive.224
First, the court noted that "'any kind of presentation to the jury or the judge
to help the fact finder determine what the truth is and assimilate and understand
the evidence is itself evidence.' 25 Second, the court reasoned that "a party may
not challenge as error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that party. 226
214. Id. at 2333.




218. Id. at 2333.
219. Id.
220. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 497 (2003) (citing
King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271 (11 th Cir. 2003)).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1289.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1289-90.
225. Id. at 1289 (quoting Lillie v. United States, 953 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1992)). The court was
careful to add that if the case had been decided on summary judgment, the judge's findings of fact would be
inadmissible. Id. As it was, however, the case was decided on trial. Id. The judge's perceptions were therefore
no different from a photograph of the monument admitted as evidence. Id.
226. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1290 (quoting United States v. Ross, 131 F.3d 970, 988 (1 lth Cir. 1997)
(quoting Crockett v. Uniroyal, Inc., 772 F.2d 1524, 1530 n.4 (1 th Cir. 1985))) (internal quotes omitted).
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Justice Moore was in fact the party who requested that the district court judge
visit the monument, so that the judge could view the monument "just like a juror
would." '227 With these facts in mind, the court ruled that Justice Moore was actu-
ally attacking his own position, and the issue was therefore ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs.228
Justice Moore also argued that the district court judge should not have relied
on his subjective impressions of the monument in making his findings of fact.229
The court ruled that this argument fell short as well.23 The only reason given for
rebuttal of this argument was the fact that Justice Moore had requested the
judge's visit to the monument himself.23 ' Nevertheless, the court found that the
judge was merely "articulating findings about the impression the monument
made on the viewer" which was required to satisfy the reasonable observer
test.
232
The last factual objection Justice Moore made was that the district court had
made findings of fact which were not supported by the record.21 Specifically,
Justice Moore took issue with the judge's finding that "visitors and building
employees consider the monument an appropriate, and even compelling, place
for prayer.' '21 Refusing to overturn the district court's findings of fact unless
clearly erroneous, the court found that this specific finding was certainly plausi-
ble in light of the testimony of one of the plaintiffs and a witness at trial.23 '
Having dispensed with the factual issues raised by Justice Moore, the court
turned to the legal issues. 2" The first question was whether the plaintiffs had
standing to bring the instant lawsuit .23  The court held that for Establishment
Clause claims, the plaintiff must identify an actual personal injury suffered as a
consequence of the action by the defendant, as opposed from mere psychological
damage which comes about from observation of conduct with which one dis-
agrees.2" In this case, the plaintiffs would have standing if they were "forced to
assume special burdens to avoid unwelcome religious exercises. "239 Under this
reasoning, the court found that the three plaintiffs had standing because the actions
of Justice Moore caused them to "feel like outsiders. 240 In addition, the fact that
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1290-91. Justice Moore also argued that the judge's findings of fact should have been read into
the record. Id. The court dismissed this claim, both because it was an "extraordinary" procedure, and because
Justice Moore did not request the procedure at trial. Id.
229. Id. at 1291. As will be discussed infra, this is perhaps a more difficult issue than the court here
makes it out to be. See also supra note 22.






236. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1291.
237. Id. at 1291-92.
238. Id. at 1292 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Sep. of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 485 (1982)).
239. Id. (quoting ACLU v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098, 1107 (11 th Cir.
1983)) (internal quotes omitted).
240. Id.
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two of the plaintiffs had altered their behavior was found to be clearly sufficient to
establish standing.24' Because two of the plaintiffs were undoubtedly found to have
standing, the third was automatically ruled to have standing as well.242
The court next turned its attention to the heart of the case: the Establishment
Clause issue. First, the court considered whether the Establishment Clause even
applied to Justice Moore. 243  The court noted that the language of the First
Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law. 244 Justice Moore, of
course, is not Congress.24 Regardless, the court, citing Everson, recognized that
the First Amendment now applies to all laws through the Fourteenth
Amendment.246  Justice Moore argued, however, that the First Amendment did
not apply to him because no "law" was involved. 247  He argued that his place-
ment of the monument was merely governmental action which promoted reli-
gion, and not a law which commanded or prohibited religious conduct.248
Without going into detail or explaining its reasoning, the court found that the
decision in Allegheny stood "foursquare against the notion that the
Establishment Clause permits government to promote religion so long as it does
not command or prohibit conduct. 249
Second, the court dealt with Justice Moore's argument that the First
Amendment could not apply to him because his conduct was not religious in
nature."' In support of this argument, he defined "religion" as "'the duty which
we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it." 2 ' Accordingly, the
Ten Commandments do not involve the duties owed by individuals to their cre-
241. Id.
242. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1293 (citing Rabun County, 698 F.2d at 1108-09). Additionally, the court
found that it was the monument itself, not the personal religious beliefs of Justice Moore, which caused the
plaintiffs' injury. Id. If the plaintiffs had merely disagreed with the views of Justice Moore, their injuries




246. Id. (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)). Incorporation of the First Amendment to
apply to the states, although seemingly unquestioned by the Supreme Court since Everson was decided, has
been criticized. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678-79 (2002) ("[I]n the context of the
Establishment Clause, it may well be that state action should be evaluated on different terms than similar action
by the Federal Government. States, while bound to observe strict neutrality, should be freer to experiment with
involvement in religion ... than the Federal Government.") (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotes omitted)
(citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 699 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); Newdow, 124
S. Ct. at 2330 ("[Tlhe Constitution left religion to the states.") (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 2 J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1873 (5th ed. 1891); A. AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 32-42, 246-257 (1998)). See also RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997) (arguing from an historical
and textual standpoint that the Fourteenth Amendment does not support incorporation of the Bill of Rights and
its resulting application to the states.).
247. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1293 (citing Appellant's Brief at 19) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 44).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1294 (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 612 (1989)). The court also quoted
language from an Eleventh Circuit case which is more explanatory: "'[i]f a statute authorizing the teachers'
activities would be unconstitutional, then the activities, in the absence of a statute, are also unconstitutional."'
Id. (quoting Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1533-35 (11th Cir. 1983), affd sub nom. Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38 (1985)).
250. Id.
251. Id. (quoting Appellant's Brief at 11-12) (quoting VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. I, § 16
(1776)).
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ator, they merely "represent the moral foundation of secular duties that individu-
als owe to society."2 2 The court, again citing Allegheny, disagreed." 3 The court
found that the Supreme Court's definition of religion does not necessarily
encompass a belief in a Creator, and that the Ten Commandments are inherently
religious in nature, and not just a moral representation of secular duties.2" Thus,
the First Amendment yet again applied to Justice Moore's actions.
Next the court proceeded to apply the Lemon test to Justice Moore's
actions."5 The court first made the "obligatory observation" that the Lemon test
is highly controversial,5 6 and then applied the test nevertheless because it "'has
not been overruled.'
257
Not surprisingly, Justice Moore easily failed the first prong of the test.2 8 The
court found that there was not even an arguable secular purpose for the monu-
ment, and that Justice Moore had expressly avowed religious purposes in erect-
ing the monument.25 9 Justice Moore argued that the district court had tried to
"psychoanalyze" him in determining his purposes for erecting the monument.26 °
The court was not persuaded, however, and found that Justice Moore's religious
purposes were "self-evident. 26 1
Although violation of the first prong meant that Justice Moore had already
violated the Establishment Clause, the court also considered the "effects" prong
of the Lemon test for the sake of "completeness. '262 In order to satisfy this prong,
the trial court looked at whether a "reasonable observer" would consider the
monument to be a government endorsement of religion. 263  The district court
concluded that a reasonable observer would perceive the monument in this man-
ner, and the court of appeals agreed. 2' Thus, Justice Moore failed both the pur-
pose and the effects prongs of the Lemon test, and his actions therefore violated
the Establishment Clause.265
Justice Moore made one final argument under the Establishment Clause
under Marsh v. Chambers.26' He argued that there is a substantial history of dis-
playing the Ten Commandments in judicial buildings.267 Under Marsh, such a
252. Id.
253. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1294 (citing Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 590).
254. Id. at 1294-95.
255. Id. at 1295 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
256. Id. (citations omitted). This is a bit of an understatement. As will be seen in the analysis, infra, the
Supreme Court has retained little more than the bare skeleton of the Lemon test, with only parts of its substance.
In fact, depending on which Justice is speaking, the test has been expressly repudiated in whole or in part.
257. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 395 n.7 (1993)).
258. Id. at 1296-97.
259. Id. at 1296.
260. Id. (citing Wallace, 472 U.S. at 74 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
261. Id. at 1297.
262. Id.
263. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1297.
264. Id. The district court based its conclusion on: "the appearance of the monument itself; its location and
setting in the rotunda; the selection and location of the quotations on its sides; and the inclusion on its face of
the text of the Ten Commandments, which is an 'undeniably ... sacred text."' Id. (quoting Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39,41 (1980)).
265. Id.
266. Id. (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. 783). For an analysis of Marsh, see supra 8-9.
267. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1298.
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deeply embedded history or tradition would be sufficient to overcome the Lemon
test. 68 Justice Moore further argued that "'the monument's acknowledgment[] of
God as the source of law and liberty in America parallel[s] similar acknowledg-
ments of God at the time of America's founding." 269 The court, however, point-
ed out that Justice Moore offered no proof that his action had such historic lin-
eage,7' and dismissed his claims with the plurality's assertion in Allegheny that
"a broad reading of Marsh 'would gut the core of the Establishment Clause."271
The final issue Justice Moore brought before the court was whether he was
compelled to obey the injunction of the district court.2 Citing a long line of civil
rights era cases in which disobedient state public officials were forced to follow
the directives of a federal court, the court made short work of his assertion."3
V. ANALYSIS
The background and history of Establishment Clause case law contained
herein demonstrates the unsettled nature of the law in this area. 74 The Supreme
Court has not adopted an all-encompassing test for the resolution of cases such
as Justice Moore's. While one may be tempted to believe that, even in the
absence of reliable case law, Justice Moore's case is an easy example of an
Establishment Clause violation, the truth may not be quite so clear. For exam-
ple, keep in mind that the majority decision in Allegheny, relied upon so heavily
by the court in Glassroth, was held by only one person: Justice Blackmun him-
self27 Although four other Justices concurred as to his decision regarding the
creche, not a single one of them agreed with him in their reasoning. 6 This is
hardly the kind of precedent which would compel a particular result in the
instant case. 7
268. Id. at 1297 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983)).
269. Id. at 1298 (quoting Appellant's Brief at 44).
270. Id.
271. Id. (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603-04).
272. Id. at 1301-02.
273. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1302-03.
274. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted:
Legal duties are logically antecedent to legal rights. What may be their relation to moral rights if
there are any, and whether moral rights are not in like manner logically the offspring of moral duties,
are questions which do not concern us ... [t]hese are for the philosopher, who approaches the law
from without as part of a larger series of human manifestations. The business of the jurist is to make
known the content of the law; that is, to work upon it from within, or logically, arranging and distrib-
uting it, in order ... so far as practicable.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 175 (Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881). While most readers
would undoubtedly agree with this assertion, the preceding Supreme Court case law suggests that the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is greatly influenced by the individual Justices' moral and/or philosophical
beliefs. Thus, the Justices approach Establishment Clause law "from without."
275. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578.
276. Id. at 578-608.
277. The splintered opinions in Newdow affirm this assertion. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
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A. Current Approaches to Establishment Clause Analysis
To figure out exactly where the individual Supreme Court members stand on
their interpretation of the Establishment Clause, it is helpful to group them into
three camps. The first camp is the accommodationists, and more or less includes
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rhenquist. The accommo-
dationist approach is best exemplified by Justice Kennedy's dissent in
Allegheny, wherein he urged a simple two-part test to determine whether an
Establishment Clause violation occurred.278 First, has the government coerced
anyone to participate in a particular religion?279  Second, has the government
granted such strong benefits that it has in effect set up a state church?28 ° The
accommodationist approach also places strong emphasis on historical religious
practices which have been tolerated by the state. 81 Justice Burger introduced this
approach in Lynch, 2 and Justice Rhenquist elaborated in his dissent in Stone.
28 3
The historical approach looks not only to historical religious practices that have
existed since the time of the founding, but also to practices that have developed
in more modem history.
28
In short, the accommodationist approach recognizes that the Establishment
Clause does not bar all church and state relations, and that some mixture of the
two is not only inevitable, but is permissible. In order to determine whether the
mixture has gone beyond the bounds of the Establishment Clause, the accommo-
dationist looks to whether individuals are compelled to engage in certain reli-
gious practices, and looks also to whether the state's involvement with religion
has been accepted historically.
The next approach could be characterized as the neutrality approach. This is
the approach which was espoused by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence in
Allegheny," and reaffirmed in Newdow.288 Justice O'Connor submits the follow-
ing test: Has the government endorsed religion?287 Whether or not it has is deter-
mined from the perspective of a "reasonable observer. '288 According to
O'Connor's dissent in Newdow, the reasonable observer is required to consider
the history and the origins of the religious practice or display in question. 89
Understandably, this test places great emphasis on the facts and circumstances of
each individual case. 9 For instance, O'Connor essentially applied this test in
Lynch, and found that the display in question was constitutional.2 9' However,
278. 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 662.
282. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).
283. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 46 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
284. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 631-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Noting that prayer in public schools is a historical
practice). Public school prayer is, of course, only as old as public school itself.
285. 492 U.S. at 623-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
286. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2321-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
287. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630-39.
288. Id.
289. 124 S. Ct. at 2322 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
290. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 636.
291. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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she applied it to a similar creche in Allegheny and found the display to be uncon-
stitutional.292 The test also places great emphasis on the visual objects surround-
ing the allegedly religious display in question.293 As the observant reader has
undoubtedly noted, the "reasonable observer" test held primary importance in
the court's decision in Glassroth.294
The third approach is the separationist approach. This approach is exempli-
fied by Justice Brennan's dissent in Lynch,29 the concurring opinions in
Lemon,29 the majority opinion in Stone,297 the dissent in Marsh,29 and the com-
bined concurrence and dissents in Allegheny.29 As its name implies, the separa-
tionist approach mandates a complete separation of church and state."' On the
current Court, Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer would locate
themselves within the separationist camp. The separationist approach continues
to make mention of all or part of the Lemon test, but essentially holds to an even
simpler test: government can have no involvement with religion whatsoever.3 '
The government must be completely secular in its relations to society. 2 The
government absolutely cannot benefit religion in any manner, direct or indi-
rect. 3 Government cannot be associated with religion by any means. As an
example, the separationist approach believes that there will always be a reason-
able observer who is offended by a potentially religious display located near a
judicial building. 4  Justice Souter has utilized a reasonable observer test.3 0
However, his test utilizes a more subjective reasonable observer than that of
Justice O'Connor. 6 Thus, Justice Souter's reasonable observer is more predis-
posed to finding government endorsement of religion.
Justice Thomas has arguably introduced a fourth approach in his concur-
rence in Newdow.3 7 This approach would leave the establishment clause issue
essentially in the hands of the states.0 Arguably the only time the establishment
clause issue would arise would be in the context of coercion, where a state or the
292. 492 U.S. at 623-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
293. Id. at 624-27.
294. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1297-99 (1 th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 497 (2003).
295. 465 U.S. at 694-726 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
296. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625-42 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
297. Stone, 449 U.S. at 39-43.
298. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795-822 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
299. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 623-80.
300. Its proponents adhere to Thomas Jefferson's oft-quoted statement: "We must erect a wall of separa-
tion between church and state." See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673; Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
301. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 698 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624-25 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 802 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
302. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 698 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
303. Id. at 701.
304. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
305. Examples are found in Justice Souter's opinions in several school funding cases which are not treated
in this Note. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 247 (1992); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000);
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686 (2002).
306. Compare supra note 305, with Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
307. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2327-33 (Thomas J., concurring). He alluded to this approach in Zelman. 536
U.S. at 679 (Thomas, J., concurring),
308. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2330-31 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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federal government has established a particular religion and is coercing adher-
ence by the citizenry." 9 While Justice Thomas is still grouped with the accomo-
dationists, it seems unlikely that his views will be shared by other members of
the accommodationist group.
310
It is with this convoluted background of precedent that the court in
Glassroth approached the Establishment Clause question. The court reached for
the only sure test it knew, the Lemon test, and attempted to make a decision
based on these grounds. 1 ' However, it is important to note that the Lemon test
was not the only route the court could have taken. Judging by the fact that the
Lemon test is roundly criticized,312 and essentially none of the justices currently
sitting on the Supreme Court cling to the Lemon test in its entirety,313 the court
could have easily taken a different approach. As it was, the court seemed to use
the Lemon test as modified by Justice O'Connor in Lynch, 314 and further modi-
fied by her reasonable observer test set forth in Allegheny."'
B. Application of the Accommodationist Approach
If the Court had applied Justice Kennedy's test from Allegheny,"' Justice
Moore's position could conceivably have been accepted in its entirety. First of
all, Justice Moore was not attempting to compel religious practices. He merely
placed the monument in the courthouse. Albeit, the monument was hard to miss.
However, no one was compelled to bow down before the monument or to
become a practicing Christian. There were no armed guards stationed about the
monument to insure compliance with Justice Moore's mandate. Nor was there
any evidence of Justice Moore's intent to compel religious behavior. His intent
was merely to "remind" the public of what he believed to be the moral founda-
tion of our law.
Second, there had been no action by the state to set up a state church. No
state funds were expended in the placement of the monument. Justice Moore
was not setting up a state church of the Ten Commandments with compulsory
attendance by all. Furthermore, there has been a history of placing the Ten
Commandments within courtrooms.1 Although the court in Glassroth pointed
309. Id. at 2331-32.
310. The sole exception is perhaps Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia did not participate in the Newdow deci-
sion, so his thoughts on Justice Thomas's approach are unavailable. However, Justice Thomas did make exten-
sive citation of Justice Scalia's dissents in previous cases. This suggests that the two Justices may share views
on this approach.
311. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1295-98.
312. Id. at 1296.
313. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting with knowing cynicism that the Lemon test
was ignored in the decision of the case); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655-56 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-112
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring). Even though the
test is sometimes still applied by the separationist Justices, they often use only the secular purpose prong or
effect prong.
314. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-94.
315. 492 U.S. at 623-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
316. Id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
317. For example, see Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677 (statue of Moses and the Ten Commandments is found with-
in the United States Supreme Court).
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out that Justice Moore's placement of the Ten Commandments was more
extreme than previously upheld placements," 8 this would be of little import when
gauged by a test which ignores the perspective of the phantom reasonable
observer. 19 The court in Glassroth also downplayed the historical significance of
the monument, and criticized Moore for "presuppos[ing] a belief in God."32
However, as Chief Justice Rehnquist, and even Justice O'Connor, noted in
Newdow, this nation was founded on a pre-supposed belief in a deity.321 Justice
Moore's recognition of that fact is certainly not automatic grounds for violation
of the Establishment Clause under an accommodationist approach. In addition,
the accommodationist approach would likely have given more import to Justice
Moore's avowed secular purposes in placing the monument.
322
One could, however, surmise that Justice Moore's position was still too loud
to be upheld in its entirety by an accommodationist Court. His position, at least,
seems to have less of a secular purpose than the other government practices and
displays in question in the other cases in this Note.
C. Application of a Neutrality Approach
The neutrality test, which essentially was applied by the court in
Glassroth,323 would likely have failed Justice Moore's position as it stood.
Justice O'Connor's reasonable observer requires, as a threshold matter, that the
government hold an ultimately secular purpose in its actions. 324  With this in
mind, her reasonable observer would have had a hard time denying the religious
import of the massive monument, especially with the force of Justice Moore's
rhetoric backing it up. Although Justice Moore could argue the historical signifi-
cance of the monument, it is unlikely that Justice O'Connor would find an
instance of "ceremonial deism. '3 2s She would probably find that, since litigation
was immediately instigated, the monument was not historically well tolerated
like the display in Lynch,3 28 and the Pledge in Newdow 27 In addition, she would
318. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1300-01.
319. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995).
320. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1295, 1297-98.
321. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2319-20, 2322-23 (Rehnquist, C.J., & O'Connor, J., concurring).
322. The court in Glassroth found that, despite Moore's assertions to the contrary, his religious intentions
were "self-evident." 335 F.3d at 1297. For instance, the court noted Moore's statement that the monument
was intended to acknowledge "God's overruling power over the affairs of men." Id. at 1296. Contrast this
with Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach in Newdow, wherein he associated the words "under God" with vari-
ous religious statements by national figures. 124 S. Ct. at 2317 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Examples
include George Washington's citation of Psalm 121:1 at the first inauguration: "I raise my eyes toward the
hills, Whence shall my help come?" Id.; Washington's first thanksgiving proclamation, which proclaimed "a
day of public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and sig-
nal favours of Almighty God," Id. at 2317 n.3 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 675 n.2) (internal quotations omit-
ted); and Washington's statement "it is the duty of all Nations to acknowledge the problems of Almighty God,
to obey His will, to be grateful for his benefits, and humbly to implore his protection and favor." Id. at 2317.
Despite the association, Rehnquist nevertheless found the pledge to be entirely constitutional. Id. at 2320.
323. 335 F.3d 1282.
324. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
325. Id. at 630.
326. 465 U.S. at 684.
327. 124 S. Ct. at 2317.
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note that Moore's statement that the monument was meant to refer to the God of
the Bible, and the fact that the King James Version of the Bible was utilized
indicates that the government was endorsing a particular religion:
Christianity.328 Thus, exactly as the plaintiffs in Glassroth alleged, the monu-
ment would cause individuals to feel like outsiders because of their differing
religious beliefs.
However, had Justice Moore truly desired to make the monument stick, he
could have altered his position to at least warrant consideration by the neutrality
position. For example, he could have changed the visual appearance of the mon-
ument. If he had chosen a thousand pound monument, instead of a five thousand
pound monument, and if he had included Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s speech in
closer proximity to the monument,329 the reasonable observer would have been
less likely to be offended. Also, he could have included various numberings of
the Ten Commandments which are accepted by different religions.3 Including
more than one numbering would lessen the appearance that the government was
endorsing a particular religion. In the alternative, Justice Moore could have simply
placed blank tablets in the rotunda and added a figure of Moses or some other
object to identify the tablets as the Ten Commandments.
Doubtless, Justice Moore would have had to make a stronger argument for
the secular purposes behind the monument." While his statements would likely
have been sufficient as they stood for an accommodationist approach,332 a neu-
trality approach would have required Moore's statements to convince a reason-
able observer of his secular purposes. The Glassroth court's reasonable observ-
er was certainly not convinced. Secular purposes in this case could have been
recognition of the origins of law, or possibly even recognition of the traditional
deity acknowledged by the nation, with whom the law has traditionally been
associated."
328. Cf Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
329. The reader will remember that this is an action which Justice Moore expressly refused to perform.
Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1287.
330. The Glassroth court alluded to this possibility. Id. at 1299 n.3. In a footnote, the court noted that the
"Jewish, Catholic, Lutheran, and Eastern Orthodox faiths use different parts of their holy texts as the authorita-
tive Ten Commandments... choosing which version of the Ten Commandments to display can have religious
endorsement implications under the Establishment Clause." Id.
33 1. The court in Glassroth, following the available precedent, indicated that a secular purpose comports
with the Establishment Clause, whereas a religious purpose violates same. Id. at 1296-97. The author posits
that there is a logical inconsistency in this statement. The court itself admitted that "for First Amendment pur-
poses religion includes non-Christian faiths and those that do not profess belief in the Judeo-Christian God;
indeed it includes a lack of any faith." Id. at 1294 (citing Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 590) (emphasis added). Thus,
secularism itselfclearly falls within the category of a religious belief. Why then should the court be so willing
to entertain practices which are associated with secular beliefs? Is this what the Constitution requires? Perhaps
this is the issue Justice Kennedy had in mind when he noted that the endorsement test manifests an "unjustified
hostility" toward traditional religion. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
332. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
333. The Glassroth court suggested that secular purposes could include use of the Ten Commandments for
secular studies of history, civilization, or comparative religion. 335 F.3d at 1295 (citing Stone, 449 U.S. at 42).
Justice Moore argued that the monument was only meant to reflect the moral foundation of the secular duties
that individuals owe to society. Id. at 1294. The court either did not believe that Justice Moore was sincere in
this belief, or did not believe that this was truly a secular purpose.
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Under O'Connor's opinion in Newdow, Justice Moore would have also been
required to associate the monument only with a generic deity, and with no reli-
gion in particular."u He would not be able to refer, as he did, to "the God of the
Holy Scriptures." 5
D. Application of a Separationist Approach
Under a separationist approach it is clear that the monument would have
failed. Any object of such traditional religious significance would be excluded
from public places. For example, Justice Stevens would note that at least some-
one within the State of Alabama would find the display of the Ten
Commandments to be religious in nature.336 With the firm conviction that reli-
gious and secular life should be separate, this finding alone would be sufficient
to violate the Establishment Clause. Further argument need not be made here
because Justice Moore would be doomed to failure.
E. Application of Justice Thomas's Approach
Lastly, Justice Moore's case is evaluated here under Justice Thomas's
approach in Newdow.337 While it is unlikely at the present time that this test
would be used to decide cases such as Justice Moore's, it is nevertheless relevant
because it is held by one and possibly two Justices. In addition, the results it
would produce are radically different from the results which would come and
which have come from the approaches of the other Justices.
First, it is unlikely that Justice Thomas would consider Justice Moore's case
to even be an Establishment Clause issue. Justice Thomas would reason that the
Establishment Clause was meant only to apply to the federal government, and
not to the states.338 Thus, Justice Moore would be free even to place symbols of
the Christian religion in the state courthouse. Given the fact that Justice Moore
paid for the monument entirely from his own pocket, it is likely that Moore's
arguments would be sufficient to pass constitutional scrutiny with no modifica-
tion whatsoever. 9
Trouble for Justice Moore under Justice Thomas's analysis would only arise
if Justice Moore began a process of coercion." For instance, if Justice Moore
later instituted a policy requiring all visitors to the rotunda to engage in prayer at
the Ten Commandments monument, or a requirement that the lawyers of Alabama
memorize the contents of the Ten Commandments in order to be accepted by the
334. See Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2325-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
335. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1296. It should be noted at this point that Justice Moore made no mention of
the Christian religion. While he referred to "God" and to "the Holy Scriptures," he made no mention of "Jesus
Christ." Thus, he arguably made no reference to a particular religion.
336. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 650-51 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Obviously the
offended plaintiffs in the Glassroth litigation prove this point.
337. See Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2327-33 (Thomas, J., concurring).
338. Seeid. at 2328.
339. While Justice Thomas does express concern over the issue of state government preference of a partic-
ular religion, Justice Moore's stated position does not explicitly endorse a particular religion. See supra note
335.
340. See Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2331-32.
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bar. However, it is also conceivable that these practices would be perfectly legit-
imate under Justice Thomas's analysis, provided that there was no establishment
of religion.
More important are the federalism implications raised by Justice Thomas's
approach. As he noted in Newdow, he believes that the primary purpose of the
Establishment Clause was to actually protect state religious practices from feder-
al intervention." ' This being the case, Justice Moore's treatment at the hands of
the Eleventh Circuit would have been reversed by this approach. Federal district
courts would arguably have no place in directing the religious affairs of Justice
Moore and the State of Alabama. The emphasis would be on allowing the State
of Alabama to pursue its own religious course, and not allowing the individual
plaintiffs in the Glassroth litigation to alter this course. 2
F. The Glassroth Decision
Why did the court in Glassroth choose to apply the reasonable observer test?
At the present, it is unclear how many Justices, aside from O'Connor, actually
embrace the test. 3 Why did the court even make mention of the roundly criti-
cized and archaic Lemon test? There are several possibilities. First, this could
indicate a shift in the law; an emerging body of First Amendment jurisprudence
which will attempt to find common ground between the accommodation and sep-
aration camps. More likely, however, the Eleventh Circuit was attempting to
predict how the Supreme Court would vote on the matter. As the current Court
stands, there are four accommodationists, one neutral, and four separationists.
By inference it can be seen that the neutral vote is oftentimes the vote which will
decide an Establishment Clause case.
In this instance, the court likely predicted that Justice O'Connor would per-
ceive the Ten Commandments monument as an endorsement of religion by the
state. At the same time, the court knew that the separationist camp would find
Justice Moore's actions unconstitutional. This explains the tremendous weight
the trial court and the appellate court placed on the "reasonable observer" test. It
also explains why Justice Moore contested the district court's findings of fact so
vigorously. For, despite the seemingly contradictory nature of his factual argu-
ments,' it is plausible that he was trying to draw out the flaws in the reasonable
observer test. After all, was not the reasonable observer in this instance the trial
court judge himself? Why should the judge's perception of the Ten Commandments
341. Id. at 2330.
342. As argued by Justice Thomas, the Establishment Clause creates no individual rights. Newdow, 124 S.
Ct. at 2330 (Thomas, J., concurring). Ironically, this approach would also lend credence to Justice Moore's
assertions that he is not subject to the injunction of the federal district court (assertions for which he was later
removed from office!).
343. See Zelman, 536 U.S. 639. In Zelman, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, applied a "reason-
able observer" test. Id. at 652. However, the line of cases which lead up to and include Zelman are contained
entirely to the area of public school funding. The author would argue that these cases are distinct from the
instant case, which involves public display of a religious symbol. The only Justice who makes mention of the
test in Newdow is the test's creator: Justice O'Connor. 124 S. Ct. at 2321 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
344. I.e., requesting that the trial court judge visit the monument and then contesting that he did so. See
Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1288-89.
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monument be dispositive on the issue of whether the monument violated the
Establishment Clause? What if the trial court judge and the plaintiffs themselves
were the only observers in the State of Alabama who took offense at seeing the
monument? 5 Whose reasonable observer should then win?"4 Is it even possi-
ble for a judge to step outside of his subjective opinion and make a judgment as
a reasonable observer?" 7 Will not the result of this inquiry be decided in every
instance by the particular religion and/or biases of the judge himself? 8
These are, of course, speculative questions. But perhaps they serve to make
some sense out of the Justice Moore's arguments.
VI. CONCLUSION
As noted at the beginning of this Note, the author is of the opinion that the
Eleventh Circuit did the best they could with the available precedent. However,
in this sensitive area of the law, there exists the peculiar aspect of predicting the
legal position of particular Supreme Court Justices. The court was faced with
the task of predicting which way the swing vote would go in a deeply divided
court. As evidenced by the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari," 9 the court
345. As noted supra, this would be sufficient to satisfy the separationists of the Supreme Court.
346. To illustrate this point, a recent discussion occurred between the author and a professor over whether
a display found outside a state building was an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. The
author's reasonable observer believed that it was permissible public speech under Capitol Square and had noth-
ing to do with government endorsement. The professor's reasonable observer, on the other hand, believed
quite strongly that it was a clear case of government preference of the Christian religion. Whose reasonable
observer should win? Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Newdow recommends that the reasonable observer
form his or her opinion with the history and origins of the practice in mind. 124 S. Ct. at 2322 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). The separationist approach, as evidenced in Stevens dissent in Allegheny, points out that there
will always be a reasonable observer who could find the display offensive. 492 U.S. at 650-51 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). If this is the case, how many agreeing reasonable observers are necessary under a neutrality
approach to constitute a quorum?
347. Justice Stevens would likely argue no. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 650-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor would likely argue yes. See Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2322 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The
reader may decide for himself.
348. Speaking of, inter alia, the Establishment Clause, former judge Robert Bork argues that when "a cul-
tural Court acts without guidance from the historic Constitution, the Justices [can] produce a coherent jurispru-
dence of individual rights only if they [] construct and agree upon a systematic moral philosophy. Moral
philosophers have been unable to agree on such a philosophy; it is preposterous to suppose that a committee of
lawyers could." ROBERT BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN
DECLINE 109. Others argue that a historic understanding of the Constitution is unknowable and/or impossible
to apply in "hard" cases, and that the justices necessarily must base their decisions on their own moral or reli-
gious beliefs. See Mark C. Modak-Truran, Legal Indeterminancy and the Reenchantment of the Law, 53 CATH.
U.L. REv. 709 (2004). But even assuming, arguendo, that a majority ofjustices were able to agree on a system-
atic moral philosophy in regards to Establishment Clause application, would the Court then be justified in
imposing that moral philosophy on the rest of the nation in the absence of a definitive legal text? This is a ques-
tion of the Court's legitimacy. See James L. Buckley, The Constitution and the Courts: A Question of
Legitimacy, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 189, 191 (2000) (arguing that the Court has, in certain instances,
wrongly taken "an approach to constitutional interpretation that has permitted American judges to carve their
policy preferences into constitutional granite .... ").
349. Moore v. Glassroth, 124 S. Ct. 497 (2003), denying cert. to 335 F.3d 1282.
350. See supra pp. 23-32. The court made conclusionary dismissals of several of the Chief Justice's
claims, blindly citing to controversial and divided cases, such as Allegheny. See Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1288-
1303.
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apparently made the right prediction in this case. But it is also clear that there
are much deeper issues at stake here which were not even touched on by the
court and have yet to be addressed."'
It is not inconceivable that the Supreme Court could take a case with facts
similar to these in order to further define its position regarding the Establishment
Clause, or for either the separationist or accommodationist camp to force a
showdown. It is even more probable that a case such as this, with slightly differ-
ent facts, could garner the neutral swing vote and survive constitutional scrutiny.
Hopefully this brief Note will be of assistance to those practitioners who are
involved in such a future Establishment Clause dispute.
350. See supra pp. 23-32. The court made conclusionary dismissals of several of the Chief Justice's
claims, blindly citing to controversial and divided cases, such as Allegheny. See Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1288-
1303.
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